





The Stability of Alliances -- A Game-theoretic Approach to 




 8 1 87
 7 31 






























The article develops a stochastic model,  
with both long-run streams and short-run 
shocks considered, to explain the formation, 
the breakdown, and the deterrence effect of 
an alliance.  The traditional results in words 
are restated completely and analytically by 
the formal theory.  The model finds that 
alliance-member breaks their commitments 
very often because of the inability of setting 
a complete conditional alliance to rule out 
every costly short-run shock.  The findings 
also show that the deterrence effect exists 
only when the rescuer is strong enough to 
defeat the attack.  But the alliance is never 
used.  When the actual strength of the 
rescuer is not known by the attack, 
deterrence succeeds sometimes even when 
the ally is indeed week.  The deterrence 
success therefore becomes more likely, and 
the stability of the alliance is enhanced. 
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